


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27 July 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting RE: Moscow Embassy Security 28 July 1987, 1400 hours, Situation Room

Your role at this meeting will be to provide a ten-minute briefing on the Intelligence Community's assessment of the Embassy security situation. Your presentation will follow that of George Shultz who will give an overview of the Laird, Schlesinger, and PFIAB Embassy security reports. Bill Donnelly will accompany you to this meeting.

- TAB A Talking points for your presentation.
- TAB B Your memo to the President on the Embassy security problem and the report by DIA, NSA, CIA and FBI on the same subject.
- TAB C Overview of the Laird, Schlesinger and PFIAB reports.

 The Directorate of Administration is pulling together a summary of these three reports and we will provide it to you later this afternoon.

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

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27 July 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

FOR THE

NSPG Meeting RE: Moscow Embassy Security 28 July 1987, 1400 hours, Situation Room

Mr. President, as I indicated in my recent memorandum to you, I strongly recommend that we move promptly and firmly to correct the unacceptable security situation in our Moscow mission.

- I fully endorse Jim Schlesinger's view that corrective actions taken in Moscow will be effective only to the extent that we successfully integrate physical, technical and personnel security.
- -- While many of the recommendations put forward by the Laird, Schlesinger, and PFIAB reports will take time to review and implement, I believe we should start immediately to set into motion a program of action to correct the security situation in Moscow.

To this end, I asked CIA, NSA, DIA, and the FBI to review the three reports, and provide me their expert views and recommendations. Based on a report produced by the interagency team, I recommend:

- The highest priority must be given to restoring security and habitability to the Existing Office Building.
- The review of personnel nominated for assignment to Moscow must be more comprehensive, including polygraph, and the security and suitability standards made more stringent and uniform.
- -- Major investments must be undertaken to correct the grossly inadequate physical security situation in Moscow.

 To neutralize the existing technical penetration of our
New Office Building in Moscow, we must dismantle and
reconstruct significant portions of the building. If
time and money were not constraints, the building
ideally should be replaced completely. Also,
aggressive exploitation of the Soviet monitoring
systems in the New Office Building should be continued.


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- A Diplomatic Security Agency, as described in the PFIAB report, should be established.
- As recommended by PFIAB, the DCI should be granted authority for establishing overseas security policy and standards and certifying the security of our overseas missions.

Mr. President, accomplishing our objectives of security in the New Office Building will require unprecedented cooperation from the Soviets. If we fail to achieve the necessary agreements with them, this will place an even greater premium on obtaining an assured level of security in the Existing Office Building and I believe should cause us to block the Soviets from occupying the Mt. Alto chancellery. As for the amount of secured space required for Moscow, that will of course depend on the size of the mission there.

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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